This paper tests for the Euro zone the hypothesis put forward by Sapir and Sekkat (1999) that synchronizing elections might improve welfare. After identifying a political budget cycle in the Euro zone we build a politico-macroeconomic model and simulate the effects of adopting a common election day in the 12 Euro zone member states. The results support most of the theoretical predictions by Sapir-Sekkat: (i) Synchronizing the elections could enhance GDP growth, reduce unemployment, but leads to increased inflation and in some countries to a deterioration of the budget; higher inflation forces ECB to monetary restrictions. (ii) If the synchronization happens asymmetrically -either only in the large or only in the small Euro zone countries -the result depends on the size of the spillovers. (iii) As anticipated in Sapir -Sekkat a common election day is a further step towards the desired "European business cycle", however, at the cost of increasing its amplitude. Harmonizing elections is another method of policy coordination. Whether this leads to higher welfare is a matter of weighting the different macroeconomic outcomes and it also depends on the model applied.
Introduction
The primary objective of this paper is the empirical evaluation of the theoretical postulate by Sapir and Sekkat (1999) that the adoption of a single election day throughout the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of the European Union (EU) might be welfare improving. They find that the desirability of an electoral area (a common or synchronized election day) between two countries is enhanced when the spillovers between these countries are large and positive, and when they face symmetric shocks. EMU with its asymmetric architecture of economic policy making is forced by EU law (EC treaty) to coordinate its economic (primarily fiscal) policy between its politically independent member states in order not to foil the centralized monetary policy by the ECB. The economic policy coordination is exercised in EMU by a whole range of coordination processes and instruments, of which the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is the most prominent one in the field of fiscal policy. As a consequence of the economic policy coordination we are already on the right track towards a "European business cycle". However, as economic policy making (with the exception of monetary policy) is still a competence of the EMU member states further areas of coordination are welcome. One area where EMU's member states are still exerting uncoordinated influence (and hence, different shocks) on the economy are the different election dates.
National governments want to be reelected or further their ideology. This behavior can induce "political business cycles". With a high degree of interdependence, these cycles tend to spillover between countries. Such spillovers make economic policy coordination difficult, in particular in the context of the architecture of the EMU. There is a wide range of literature on the issue of political business cycles, starting with the ideas by Schumpeter (1935) , Kalecki (1943) and Downs (1957) and continuing with theoretical foundations by Nordhaus (1975) and others (e.g. Alesina, 1987 Alesina, , 1988 as well as many efforts to identify empirically political business cycles in different countries (see Breuss, 1980; Fair, 1978 Fair, , 1996 Fair, , 2002 Frey, 1978; Frey and Schneider, 1978a, 1978b) . Alesina et al. (1997) give a comprehensive overview on "Political cycles and the macroeconomy". Persson and Tabellini (1999) embed different election-oriented or ideologicaloriented considerations in their survey on "Political economics and macroeconomic policy".
Research has identified two different types of cycles. One school postulates that governments generate "opportunistic" cycles in order to be reelected. The other assumes that parties voted into power produce "partisan" cycles by pursuing their own ideologies. Opportunistic cycles are related to elections, while partisan cycles are connected to changes in government. The pioneers of the respective schools were McRae (1977) , Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977) . These authors adopted a non-rational expectation approach which later was largely rejected by the profession.
The new types of models incorporating rational expectations started in the mid-1980s.
Opportunistic cycles were analyzed by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) , Rogoff and Sibert (1988) , Rogoff (1990) and Persson and Tabellini (1990) . All these models share the assumption of informational asymmetry, whereby policy makers are better informed than voters about their competence. Partisan models were developed by Alesina (1987 Alesina ( , 1988 relying heavily on sluggishness in wage adjustments. Rational expectation models of political business cycles have received strong empirical support in studies by Alesina and Roubini (1992) and Alesina et al. (1997) for OECD countries.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the several models of political cycles. First, the major characteristics are presented and second, they are tested for the purpose of evaluating the Sapir and Sekkat's (1999) hypothesis of a common election cycle. Section 3 implements the result of section 2 into a model for 12 Euro-zone countries in order to derive the benefits and costs of adopting a common election cycle. Section 4 concludes.
Empirical Implications of Models of Politico-Economic Cycles
After a short characterization of the major theoretical features of the most prominent models of political cycles we test them empirically with panel regressions for the 12 EMU member states.
This gives a starting point for evaluating the hypothesis of Sapir and Sekkat (1999) concerning the pros and cons of synchronizing the national election cycles in the EMU member states. In doing so we follow the style of presentation of the relevant models of politico-economic cycles as in Alesina and Roubini (1992) and in Alesina et al. (1997) .
A. The theoretical models

2.1
The "political business cycle" (Nordhaus, 1975) The assumptions underlying Nordhaus' "political business cycle" (henceforth PBC) can be characterized as follows:
A.1. The economy is described by a Phillips curve:
where u is unemployment (rate);
is the steady state "natural" level of unemployment;
π is inflation (rate); e π is expected inflation; ε is a random shock with zero mean; γ α , are parameters. The autoregressive term in (1) captures various sources of persistence. The "natural " level of unemployment is normalized at zero, with no loss of generality. By Okun's law, the same model can be written in terms of output growth, t y , instead of unemployment.
A.2. Inflation expectations are adaptive:
A.3. Inflation is directly controlled by the policymakers; more precisely, Nordhaus (1975) assumes that policymakers control aggregate demand and, indirectly inflation.
A.4. Politicians are "opportunistic": they only care about holding office or they want to be reelected; they do not have "partisan" objectives.
A.5. Voters are "retrospective": They judge the incumbent's performance based upon the state of the economy during the incumbent's term of office. Their future perspective is myopic, i.e. only very short-lived actions are taken into consideration.
A.6. The timing of elections is exogenously fixed.
Given these assumptions, Nordhaus derives the following testable implications: (i) every government follows the same policy; (ii) towards the end of his term in office, the incumbent government stimulates the economy to take advantage of the "short-run" more favourable Phillips curve; (iii) the rate of inflation increases around the election time as a result of the preelectoral economic expansion; after the election, inflation is reduced with contractionary policy. (Persson-Taellini, 1990 Based on Nordhaus (1975) this model has been studied under the assumption of rationality. Taellini (1990, 1999 ) propose a simple model which summarizes the basic insights of this approach, due to Rogoff and Sibert (1988 A.2''.
Rational political business cycle models
includes all the relevant information except the level of "competence" of different policy makers. The original proponents of the "competence" model are Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) .
Assumption A.5 is substituted by:
A.5'. Voters choose the candidate which is rationally expected to deliver the highest utility, if elected.
A.5". There are no differences in voters' utility functions.
(.) E is the expectation operator and "competence" is defined as their ability of keeping unemployment low (and GDP growth high) with a relatively low level of inflation.
2.3
The "partisan theory" (Hibbs, 1977 (Hibbs, , 1987 The strong version of the "partisan theory" (henceforth PT) based upon a non-rational A.5". Each voter is aware of thes e ideological differences and votes for the party which offers the policy closer to this most preferred outcome.
The assumption of partisanship is justified by the distributional consequences of unemployment.
In periods of low growth, low inflation and high unemployment the relative share of income of the upper middle class, increases and the other way around (see Hibbs, 1987 ).
The PT model implies that different parties choose different points on the Phillips curve: output growth and inflation should be permanently higher and unemployment permanently lower when the left is in offices than with right wing governments. If one assumes that politicians are both opportunistic and partisan and voters are retrospective as implied by A.5, one obtains a "weaker" form of PT which coexists with the Nordhaus model (see Frey and Schneider, 1978a and Nordhaus, 1989 ). (Alesina, 1987) Alesina (1987, 1988) suggests a "rational partisan theory" (henceforth RPT). This models adopts A.1, A. [ ]
"Rational partisan theory"
where
identifies the "left" and the "right" parties. The difference between the two parties can be summarized by at least one of these three sets of inequalities:
c and K are the objectives for inflation and unemployment respective, δ and b are weights. The last double inequality implies the time-inconsistency problem in monetary policy pointed out by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Gordon (1983a, 1983b) . Since at least one of the two parties targets a level of output growth which is above the natural rate, it introduces an "inflation bias" because of the lack of recommitments in monetary policy.
This model produces a political cycle under the assumption of sluggish wage adjustments and of uncontingent labour contracts signed at discrete intervals which not coincide with the political terms of office. Changes in the inflation rate associated with changes in government create temporary deviations of real economic activity from its natural level. The following testable implications can be derived from the RPT: (i) at the beginning of a right-wing (left-wing) government output growth is below (above) its natural level and unemployment is above (below);
(ii) after expectations, prices and wages adjust, output and unemployment return to their natural level; after this adjustment period, the level of economic activity should be independent of the party in office; (iii) the rate of inflation should remain higher throughout the term of a left-wing government. (Breuss, 1980; Rogoff, 1990) Breuss ( .
Political budget cycle models
G is a variable representing the business cycle, either measured by the potential output gap or the GDP growth rate. Politicians can only influence the structural component via discretionary fiscal policy and hence are able to "add" to the normal business cycle an extra "political cycle". The testable hypothesis follows from the assumptions in Nordhaus (1975) or more explicit in Breuss (1980) and in Rogoff (1990) . (i) either every government follows the same policy (A.4) or it has partisan objectives (A.4'); members of left-wing parties are more concerned with unemployment and growth (Keynesian-bias) and relatively less concerned with inflation;
members of right-wing parties have opposite preferences; (ii) toward the end of his term in office, the incumbent stimulates the economy by increasing public expenditures and/or reducing taxes (e.g. timing a tax reform so that its impact is felt before elections or in the year of the election) which leads to increased budget deficits; (iii) after the election day at least under the rules of the SGP EMU member states are forced to balance the budget. This election-oriented behaviour of governments leads to a pronounced budget cycle in the case of opportunistic government behaviour following the same policy or in the case of partisan objectives.
Optimum electoral area: EMU with a single election day (Sapir-Sekkat, 1999)
Sapir and Sekkat (1999) extend the models of Persson and Tabellini (1990) and Alesina (1987) to a situation with two interdependent countries generating either positive or negative international spillovers. For each model they compare welfare under two scenarios: one with a single election date, the other with different dates. Intuitively, a single election date could be thought of beeing detrimental to welfare, because it synchronizes cycles, thereby increasing their amplitude. In contrast, they find that electoral coordination is never harmful provided international spillovers are positive. Furthermore, they show that the desirability of establishing an electoral area between two countries is enhanced when the spillovers between these countries are large and positive, and when they face symmetric shock. This is reminiscent of the gain from an "optimum currency area" à la Mundell (1961) .
There are two economies denoted by A and B (a * refers to economy B) , each generating its own cycle which is also transmitted to the other economy via spillovers. In each economy, the cycle is produced by governments attempting to be reelected. The political cycles may be "opportunistic" or "partisan". A three-period model is formulated to investigate two options: one where the two countries hold elections at the same time, the other where elections take place at different dates.
The three-period model is presented for country A. At each election the "incumbent" competes with the "opponent" (denoted by i and o respectively). Voters are rational and forward looking (assumption A.2'). They elect the candidate who minimizes their expected loss function. In the case of "opportunistic" cycles all voters are assumed to be identical.
where π is the inflation rate at time t , t X the employment at time t ( 
where K denotes the utility from being elected and Z is a dummy variable which has the value one if the candidate is elected and zero othe rwise.
The elected government manipulates inflation, which, if unanticipated, generates employment. 
where µ measures "competence", β measures the degree of international spillover (the extent to which unanticipated inflation in one country affects employment in the other) and the superscript e stands for expectations. Like in Persson and Tabellini (1990) , competence µ is a random variable.
The degree of international spillover, β can be either positive or negative since expansionary macroeconomic policy (e.g. via an expansionary fiscal policy, hence producing a "political budget cycle) can have two impacts: (i) expansion of aggregate demand increases employment in both countries; (ii) it creates inflation, reduces real wages, and improves competitiveness in the expanding country at the expense of the other country.
The Sapir -Sekkat (1999) model can be applied either for "opportunistic" political cycles or for "partisan" cycles. In the latter case voters have identical preferences towards employment (whose optimal level is assumed to be zero), but differ with respect to inflation.
B. Empirical results
As we are interested only in the eva luation of the synchronizing of election cycles in EMU to transfer (public good) spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems. In such systems also higher total primary spending is predicted when the share of transfer spending is high (low).
In order to evaluate the Sapir-Sekkat (1999) hypothesis, one must test whether some kind of political cycle is evident anyway in the Euro zone countries. For this purpose we test the implications of the Nordhaus PBC model (Table 1) , the partisan models (Table 2 ) applying in each case the specific dummy. In the tests of the budget cycle models (Table 3) we apply both dummies (EL and PA).
As in many other empirical tests the simple Nordhaus PBC model is rejected. The respective political dummy (EL) is insignificant in Table 1 . forecasts; Y = growth rate of real GDP in %; U-diff = difference between the unemployment rate of country i und the "Euro zone" unemployment rate" in % points; P = inflation rate in %; YEUR = growth rate of real GDP of the aggregate Euro zone; PEUR = inflation rate of the aggregate Euro zone; EL = election dummy.
Also the test of the partisan models in Table 2 reject s their hypothesis -at least with our political dummy (PA) and for our sample of countries and annual data. In contrast to the affirmative test by Alesina and Roubini (1992) with quarterly data, but with a different sample of countries and other time period, no macroeconomic variable (GDP growth, unemployment and inflation) can be explained by the partisan dummy. The test for the electoral budget cycle model in Table 3 They regress their indicator for discretionary fiscal policy (DP) -divided into discretionary expenditure, discretionary revenue, growth dividend and inflation dividend -on the deficit gap (actual minus deficit target) as a variable for the consolidation effort in the context of the SGP commitments, the output gap (effect of the business cycle) and two election dummies (a pre -or early election year dummy, and a full-blown election year dummy -like our EL du mmy). Interestingly, their estimated coefficient for EL is the same as in our regression of only the structural component of the budget balance (D S ), namely 0.4 (see their Table 4 on page 38 and our Table 3 ).
Also a direct test, whether only the business-cylce-adjusted or structural component of the budget balance (D S ) (applying data from the AMECO data base of the European Commission) is used, reveals the significant impact of the EL dummy.
The Costs and Benefits of a Common Election Day in EMU
A Politico -economic model for the Euro zone
In order to test the Sapir-Sekkat ( 1)) , the debt to GDP ratio (S), the size of the governmentpublic expenditure in % of GDP -G), the inflation rate (P), the real short-term interest rate in the Euro zone (R-P), the political dummies EL and PA, the GDP growth dampening effect of the fiscal policy stance under the SGP rules and the lagged dependent variable (Y( -1)):
This equation (for which all the coefficients with the exception for those of PA are significant) is used for all 12 Euro zone member states with the only difference in the size of the constant. For most countries this equation fits quit well the development of GDP. As one can see in this specification the political dummy EL enhances GDP growth whereas the partisan dummy PA does not.
(
ii) Budget balances (D):
Here for each Euro zone country a separate equation is estimated in the spirit of those applied in the panel regressions of Table 3 . A prototype equation looks like this:
where 0 < β . In some cases also the dummy variable for SGP is added. In 5 out of the 12 Euro zone member states, the EL dummy is not significant (in Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain). The political dummy PA is only significant in the three large countries
France, Germany and Italy.
(iii) Unemployment rate (U):
Here the specification of the estimated equation varies slightly from country to country. But in principle the specifications are in line with those used in the panel regressions of Tables 1 and 2 .
In some country specifications we use U-diff instead of U, namely the difference between the national unemployment rate and the aggregate Euro zone unemployment rate (UEUR). Political dummies EL and PA do play no role in the country equations.
(iv) Rate of i nflation (P):
Inflation is also estimated separately for each of the 12 Euro zone member states with more or less the same specification, following the approaches of Tables 1 and   2 . A representative specification is the following:
In some cases Y is substituted by unemployment ( U) in the inflation equation. The primary influence is captured by the spillover from the aggregate inflation rate of the Euro zone (PEUR).
(v) Euro zone aggregates and the Taylor rule: In addition we consider the aggregate Euro zone variables YEUR, UEUR and PEUR, which are calculated by using the respective GDP weights of the 12 Euro zone member states.
To capture the interest rate behaviour of the ECB for the Euro zone, we estimate the following Taylor rule:
This Taylor rule nicely reflects the primary goal of the ECB, namely price stability, represented by a higher weight to the inflation gap than for the GDP growth gap. An alternative would be a
Taylor rule with the lagged short-term interest rate R(-1) as an explaining variable representing the interest-rate smoothing process of monetary policy of the ECB. For our simulation purposes we prefer the equation without a lag.
With this Euro zone politico-economic model we can make simulations comparing the case of a single (synchronized) election date with those of the baseline case with different election da tes.
As we are interested in the period since EMU started we simulate over the period 1999 to 2008.
We 
Simula tion results
The results can be summarized as follows: 1) The simulations of a common election day in the 12 Euro zone member states with the own politico-economic model (see Table 4 ) leads to positive GDP effects, cumulated over the 10 years period 1999-2008; the results differ from country to country. The OEF model simulations (see Table 5 ), in contrast, lead -with the exception of Belgium -to slightly negative GDP effects. The major reason for the different results is caused by the fact that in the OEF model only the BC effect is inputted in that in this model there is no such growth enhancing effect in the GDP growth equation (11) as in our politico-economic model. Even when considering such effects in the residual of GDP the cumulated sum of GDP growth over the 10 years period remains negative , only the amplitudes increase.
2) In both models unemployment decreases and inflation goes up. This forces the ECB to restrict monetary policy -the short-term interest rates increase.
3) The impact on the budgets varies from country to country and differs also in both model simulations. In some countries the budgetary deterioration could come into conflict with the SGP objectives. Euro zone member states is important for the outcome. We simulated with the politico-eoconomic model two cases (see Table 6 ): (i) one where the synchronization of the election day only happens in the three large Euro zone member states (France, Germany and Italy).
Due to their large spillovers to the small Euro zone countries and the possible negative spillover from the small countries their impact on GDP is larger in the three countries than in the case of a full harmonization of elections and in some small countries the GDP effect is also larger. (ii) In the case of the harmonization of elections only in the nine small Euro zone member states the GDP effects are nega tive in the three large countries and often also in the small countries. 
Conclusions
The relatively poor overall macroeconomic performance of the Euro zone so far in comparison with the whole EU and with the USA in particular seems to indicate that the asymmetric architecture of policy making is not yet optimal. The process of economic policy coordination is complex and expensive. The coordination procedure around the SGP is largely foiled if national governments still pursue national interests. National governments want to be reelected or further their ideology. This behavior can induce "political business cycles". Different national elections impede the achievement of a "European business cycles" or at least one within the Euro zone.
Only in the case of a somewhat harmonized business cycle a centralized monetary policy fits to all member states. On hope is that harmonizing the election calendar could improve the overall results of economic policy coordination in the Euro zone.
The primary objective of this paper was the empirical evaluation of the theoretical postulate by Sapir and Sekkat (1999) is another method of policy coordination. Whether this leads to higher welfare is a matter of weighting the different macroeconomic outcomes and it also depends on the model applied.
